While the existing literature acknowledges the effect of banking structure on industrial growth as well as the effect of financial development on industrial growth and its volatility, we examine whether banking structure, given financial development, exerts any nontrivial effect on industrial growth volatility. We show that bank concentration magnifies industrial growth volatility, but reduces the volatility in sectors with higher external liquidity needs. The reduction in industrial growth volatility mostly reflects the smoothing in the volatility of real value added per firm growth. A variety of sensitivity checks show that our findings remain for different model specifications, banking market structure measures, liquidity need indicators, and omitted variables.
Introduction
In the past two decades, theoretical and empirical work rationalizes and supports the view that financial development exerts a significantly positive effect on economic growth (Levine 1997 (Levine , 2005 . Rajan and Zingales (1998, RZ) examine external finance as a mechanism through which financial development improves economic growth. They propose a novel specification that they apply to a large panel of cross-country, cross-industry data and find strong evidence that industries more dependent on external financing grow faster in countries with better developed financial systems. In their specification, the growth of new establishments represents the key factor through which financial development enhances industrial growth. Another strand of the literature explores whether financial development plays a role in the determination of growth volatility. For example, Raddatz (2006) applies the RZ specification and finds that financial development reduces growth volatility in sectors that need larger amounts of external liquidity, where the reduction in the volatility mainly comes from stabilizing the output growth of existing firms. The effect of financial development on growth volatility remains ambiguous, however. 1 1 Theory offers ambiguous predictions about the effect of financial development on growth volatility. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) argue that financial constraints on firms can play a key role in the propagation of the business cycle and can eventually lead to higher oscillations. Accordingly, well-developed financial systems, by removing or alleviating financial constraints, can dampen output volatility. Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) , Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004) , and Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) show that the ultimate (positive or negative) effect of financial development on volatility depends on real or monetary shocks, intermediate versus early and later stages of a country's financial development, and credit supply or demand shocks. Cross-country empirical evidence also produces mixed findings. Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2002) find that countries with better developed financial systems experience smoother fluctuations in per capita output growth. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) contend that financial development exerts no significant effect on growth volatility, once they control for institutions. Beck, Lundberg, and Majnoni (2006) also show that no robust linkage exists between financial development and aggregate economic volatility. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) find that financial liberalization leads to smaller (consumption) growth volatility. Levchenko, Ranciere, and Thoenig (2009) , however, find evidence that financial liberalization increases output volatility. Recently, Ćorić and Pugh (2013) Researchers typically measure financial development by the ratio of claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Aghion, Howitt, and Mayor-Foulkes, 2005) . Given their measure of bank (financial) development, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) investigate whether the market structure of the banking system exerts any influence on economic growth. Specifically, the authors test whether, for a given bank (financial) development, the amount of credit provided by more competitive or concentrated banking industry matters.
The effect of bank concentration on industrial growth is ambiguous. Pagano (1993) argues that any deviation from perfect competition in the banking market leads to inefficiencies that harm firms' access to credit, thus, hindering economic growth. Mayer (1988) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that more concentrated banking markets causes a larger incentive for banks to establish lending relationships with their client firms, thus facilitating their access to credit lines and, thus, enhancing their growth. Utilizing the RZ cross-country, cross-industry framework, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) provide empirical results showing that bank concentration exerts a negative effect on industrial growth as a whole but industries that depend more on external finance grow faster in a more concentrated banking system. Claessens and Laeven (2005) , however, show that a higher level of competition in the banking system promotes economic growth in the industries that rely more on external financing. Deidda and Fattouh (2005) argue that a nonlinear relationship exists between concentration and growth. That is, the concentration effect depends on economic development. They find that banking concentration associates negatively with both demonstrate that foreign direct investment stabilizes output growth during the era of the Great Moderation.
per-capita real income growth and industrial growth in low-income countries, but no significant relationship emerges in high-income countries.
2
Policy makers identify output growth stability as one of several macroeconomic policy objectives (Yellen and Akerlof, 2006; Mishkin, 2009 ). Many adverse effects occur because of higher output growth volatility, such as lower economic growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova, 2010) , worsened income distribution (Breen and Garcia-Peñalosa 2005) , and higher output and employment costs (Benigno and Ricci, 2011) . 3 A successful macroeconomic policy to stabilize or reduce growth volatility depends on knowing the sources of that volatility.
Intuitively, any mechanism through which financial development affects economic growth may also affect growth volatility. For example, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Raddatz (2006) finds a larger reduction in growth volatility in industrial sectors with high liquidity needs. 4 As an extension of Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), we anticipate that banking market structure influences not only growth but also its volatility.
That is, bank concentration will stabilize growth for industries with higher external liquidity needs, if banks with more market power will experience more incentives to establish and maintain long-term relationships with firms to alleviate information asymmetry and moral hazard and, thus, provide funds to firms on favorable terms even in bad times as they can extract more rents during periods of economic expansion.
2 Other studies, such as Cetorelli (2004), Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell'Ariccia (2004) , and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) , offer additional evidence that bank competition affects the formation of nonfinancial industries, the creation of firms in the nonfinancial sectors, and the market structure of nonfinancial industries. Recently, Hoxha (2013) shows that industrial firms that rely more on external financing perform better in countries with more concentrated banking markets.
3 Cross-country estimates identify the detrimental effects of macroeconomic volatility on growth, Imbs (2007), however, documents a positive growth-volatility coefficient in sectoral data. Koren and Tenreyro (2007) decompose aggregate volatility into various sources to study why GDP growth experiences more volatility in poor countries than in rich ones.
4 Larrain (2006) finds that countries with more bank credit experience lower industrial output volatility.
This paper examines how growth volatility compares between a country with an unconcentrated, thus, more competitive, banking sector or with a relatively concentrated, thus, a banking system where banks exert more market power. To this end, we rely on Raddatz's (2006) specification, augmented with alternative measures of banking market structure (bank concentration or bank competition), to test whether bank concentration leads to an increase or decrease in the volatility of industries with higher liquidity needs, after controlling for the size of the banking sector in a country. As such, this study provides a synthesis of (and/or a complement to) Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Raddatz (2006) . That is, we consider the effect of bank concentration on the volatility, controlling for bank development.
Using Raddatz's (2006) data on 70 manufacturing industries in 47 countries over the 1981 to 1998 period, we first examine the average effect of bank concentration on industrial growth volatility. That is, we test whether, overall, the growth patterns of industries exhibit more or less volatility if they operate within a more concentrated banking system. Our empirical results show that higher concentration in the banking sector strongly associates with larger industrial growth volatility. Thus, countries with a more concentrated banking market display higher industrial growth volatility. We also confirm that bank development, characterized by a large banking sector stabilizes industrial volatility. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) detect that a more concentrated banking sector associates with lower industrial growth while a larger banking sector associates with higher industrial growth. We show that both the market structure and the size of a banking system exert a nontrivial, opposite, effect on industrial growth volatility. Additionally, we confirm Cecchetti and Kharroubi's (2012) finding that more finance does not always make things better. The authors report an inverted U-shaped relationship between finance and growth. We discover a U-shaped relationship between bank development and growth volatility.
Second, the use of industry-specific information allows us to explore more deeply the role played by banking market structure on industrial growth volatility and permits us to determine whether bank concentration exerts a heterogeneous effect across industrial sectors. For this purpose, we estimate alternative regressions of industrial volatility on the interaction between an industry's liquidity needs and a country's bank concentration, controlling for country and industry dummies and other determinants of volatility. The estimated coefficients on the interaction between bank concentration and liquidity indicate a negative and significant relationship at conventional levels. These results suggest that industries more dependent on external liquidity enjoy a beneficial effect on growth volatility in countries with more concentrated banking systems.
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) argue that market power in the banking system facilitates the formation of lending relationships, which, in turn, enhances industrial growth. With this channel, we show that bank concentration alleviates industrial growth volatility and the fall in volatility mainly reflects smoothing of the variance of growth in output per firm. Moreover, we provide evidence to show a nonlinear relationship between bank concentration and economic development. Deidda and Fattouh (2005) find that bank concentration associates negatively and significantly with industrial growth in low-income countries, but the significance disappears in high-income countries. When considering the level of economic development, we discover no effect of bank concentration on industrial growth volatility for more developed countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy first proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , and later used by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Raddatz (2006) . Section 3 describes the definitions and sources of data.
Section 4 presents our main empirical results. Section 5 performs a variety of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Empirical Strategy

Benchmark Model
The first model, following Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) , assesses the overall effect of bank concentration, in addition to bank development, on industrial growth volatility, without considering the role of specific industry characteristics. In this way, we evaluate the separate, economy-wide volatility effect of bank concentration as well as bank development, common to all industrial sectors, after controlling for other country characteristics and industry fixed-effects. We specify the benchmark model as follows:
where i denotes the i-th industry and k denotes the k-th country. (2006), we include two initial conditioning variables (icvar), the initial share of a sector in a country's manufacturing value added and the log of the initial number of firms. Lastly, we include industry dummy variables (idum), which control for industry-specific effects that can affect the growth volatility of a particular industry. Since we mainly explore the effects of banking variables on sectoral volatility at the country level, we do not include country dummy variables (cdum) to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. We will use such dummy variables later in Model (3).
We can estimate Model (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS), with standard errors corrected for possible heteroskedasticity. The literature notes, however, that the OLS 6 Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) argue that a nonmonotonic relationship exists between finance and growth. That is, more finance does not always produce better outcomes, because the financial sector competes with the rest of the economy for scarce resources. They find that financial sector size exhibits an inverted U-shaped effect on productivity growth. That is, further enlargement of the financial system beyond a certain point can reduce real growth.
7 Model (1) contains a difficult and relatively uncharted issue. To wit, what set of country controls do we include in this disaggregated model? Most studies referred to above focus on aggregate volatility, whereas we focus on sectoral patterns. Our empirical findings, hence, complements these other studies.
coefficients likely include bias due to the endogeneity of bank development. Thus, we also consider estimates using two-stage least squares (2SLS) with legal origin variables from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) as instruments. The final outcomes depend on the test results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) statistics, which examine the null hypothesis that the use of instrumental variables (IV) does not change the estimation results. We present IV estimates when we reject the DWH test at the 10-percent level or better, otherwise we report the OLS coefficients.
Full Model
The benchmark model provides an average volatility effect of banking concentration.
An extended specification utilizing the industry-specific information permits decomposition of the effect of bank concentration into economy-wide and sector-specific effects to gain a deeper understanding. We specify the regression as follows:
where liq measures the liquidity needs of industry i. Raddatz (2006) uses this indicator to test whether bank development exerts a larger causal effect in the reduction of industrial volatility, resulting from the role of the banking system in the provision of external liquidity. Raddatz finds that the estimate for the interaction between bank development and liquidity needs (λ 2 ), regardless of the set of controls or the estimation technique, proves significantly negative, supporting the view that financial development leads to a decrease in the volatility in sectors with higher liquidity needs. In addition to exploring the economy-wide volatility effect of bank concentration (λ 3 ), we also test whether sectors that need more liquidity exhibit larger or smaller growth volatility when they face higher bank concentration. To accomplish this, we include the interaction between the liquidity needs of industry i and bank concentration in country k. If bank concentration leads to a larger (smaller) reduction in the volatility of sectors with high liquidity needs, the parameter, λ 4 , should be significantly negative (positive).
Deidda and Fattouh (2005) find that the relationship between bank concentration and industrial growth varies across the level of economic development. Low-income countries exhibit a significantly negative effect, but high-income countries exhibit an insignificant effect. We, thus, add an interaction term of bank concentration and economic development (i.e., real GDP per capita) to test for this potential nonlinear relationship. We find that the interaction term proves insignificant, supporting Deidda and Fattouh's argument.
Interaction-Only Model
Finally, we explore the volatility effect of banking system concentration across industries, captured by the interaction between a country's level of bank concentration and an industry's measure of liquidity needs. To do this, we replace the country control variables, bank development and bank concentration with the country dummy variables (cdum). Thus, the specification includes the interaction terms only with the level variables for bank development and bank concentration excluded. The resulting model is as follows,
where the variables are described earlier.
Concentrating on the cross-industry analysis, we test whether concentrated banking sector leads to a larger increase or decrease on the volatility of industries with high liquidity needs, which Model (2) also considers. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) argue that it is econometrically sensible to drop the vector of country controls. To include country and industry dummies can eliminate potential biases resulting from omitted country-specific covariates. Thus, Model (3) provides a robustness check for the hypotheses tested in Model (2). Additionally, focusing on the interactions only, we can compare our estimate of bank development and liquidity needs directly with that of Raddatz (2006) . That is, Model (3) equals equation (1) of Raddatz (2006, p. 682) after excluding the interaction term between liquidity needs and bank concentration. This allows us to verify whether Raddatz's (2006) key result continues to hold. A significant negative estimate of ω 1 supports his finding. Our main purpose tests whether banking market structure, independent of the size of the banking market, plays any role in the determination of growth volatility in sectors that rely more heavily on external liquidity.
A negative (positive) and significant estimate of ω 2 provides evidence supporting the view that bank concentration causes less (more) volatility in liquidity dependent industries.
Data
Raddatz (2006) assets to total banking sector assets for 1980 to 1998. These data come from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine ( , 2010 . As an alternative measure of the banking market structure, we also consider an indicator of bank competition (bcomp), which equals the average H-statistic using Panzar and Rosse's (1987) 1980-to-1998 and the 1987-to-1996 samples, respectively.
The measure of liquidity needs (liq) for each industry, the major industry-level explanatory variable, comes from U.S. Compustat data over 1980 to 1989. Specifically, we calculate the proxy for liquidity needs as the ratio of inventories to sales, which denotes the portion of inventory investment that ongoing sales revenue can finance.
Thus, a larger value of this ratio represents a higher level of external liquidity needs. For a robustness check, we follow Raddatz (2006) and use three additional proxies for the level of liquidity needs, including (i) the cash conversion cycle (cccycle), which equals the mean age of inventories plus the mean age of accounts receivables minus the mean age of accounts payable, (ii) the ratio of labor cost to sales (lcost), which evaluates the ability of a firm to finance its ongoing labor cost from its sales revenue, and (iii) the ratio of short-term debt to sales (sdebt), which appraises the real use of external liquidity and the ability of a firm to pay its current liabilities through ongoing sales.
Apart from the country dummy, other country-level variables (ccont) contain (i) the degree of democracy, which is measured by the Polity V indicator, (ii) international financial remoteness, which measures the proximity to major international financial centers, (iii) the level of economic development, which is measured by the logarithm of real per capita GDP, and (iv) trade openness, which is measured as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. We average these macroeconomic variables over 1980 to 1998.
We also include two cross-country, cross-industry variables (icvar): (i) the initial share of a sector in its country's manufacturing value added to determine if a more advanced or mature industry is systematically more stable, and (ii) the logarithm of the initial number of firms to capture the law of large number notion that a larger number of firms lowers industrial volatility.
Finally, to explore the channels through which industrial growth volatility responds to the interaction between liquidity needs and bank development and bank concentration, we examine the following three potential channels: (i) the variance of the growth of real value added per firm, (ii) the variance of the growth in the number of firms, and (iii) the covariance between the growth of real value added per firm and the growth in the number of firms. Table 2 provides the basic statistics for the selected relevant variables, and Table 3 displays the correlation matrix among major country-level variables. These results do not change qualitatively when we include these four variables together, introduce two additional initial conditioning variables and add a squared term of bank development as shown in columns (6), (7), and (8) of Table 4 , respectively.
Empirical Findings
Benchmark Model
Both the coefficients on the initial share of an industry in a country's manufacturing value added and the logarithm of the initial number of firms exert significantly negative effects at the 1-percent level, indicating that more advanced industries and a larger number of firms systematically reduce volatility. The coefficient of the squared bank development is significantly positive, which along with the significant negative coefficient of bank development suggests a parabolic relationship. That is, at low levels of bank development, a larger value reduces industrial growth volatility, but after a 11 Focusing on industrial output volatility, Larrain (2006) finds bank credit and per-capita GDP reduce and trade openness increases volatility.
certain value, more bank development associates with more growth volatility. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) argue that more finance does not always make things better. They find that financial sector size exhibits an inverted U-shape for productivity growth. We show that bank development produces a U-shaped effect on growth volatility. 12 For our purposes, bank concentration, independent of bank development, exerts a significantly positive effect on growth volatility, and that this effect remains robust to the inclusion of a variety of controlling covariates. Table 5 reports the outcome of estimating Model (2), which adds interactions between liquidity needs, bank development, and bank concentration to Model (1). The inclusion of these two interaction terms allows us to explore the possible differential effects of bank development and bank concentration on sectors with different degrees of liquidity needs. Column (1) considers the simplest case without any other country variables. In contrast to the finding in Table 4 that improved bank development reduces volatility, we now detect that bank development by itself exerts no effect on the reduction of growth volatility, judged by the insignificantly positive parameter estimate. The interaction between liquidity needs and bank development, however, exerts a negative and significant effect, confirming the volatility-reduction effect of bank development in Table 4 , but mainly occurring through liquidity needs. This result corresponds to that of Raddatz (2006) and Larrain (2006) , who offer overwhelming evidence that bank development leads to a larger reduction in the growth or output volatility in industries 12 Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find a slight inverted U-shaped effect for bank concentration on industrial output growth. The nonlinearity suggests that at intermediate values of concentration the overall growth potential of the entire economy achieves its highest value. When we check for this nonlinearity, both coefficients of bank concentration and its squared term prove positive, but insignificant. We, thus, drop the squared term of bank concentration in our volatility regressions.
Full Model
with higher external liquidity needs or financial dependence.
The estimate of the coefficient on bank concentration remains significantly positive at the 1-percent level after including the interaction of liquidity needs and bank concentration. It, thus, confirms that bank concentration exerts a harmful effect on growth volatility that, on average, affects all industries in an indiscriminate way. The interaction term between liquidity needs and bank concentration proves significantly negative at the 1-percent level. That is, higher concentration in the banking system significantly reduces the volatility of industries with high liquidity needs.
The next four columns of Table 5 include four additional country variables, one at a time. Again, all four control variables exhibit the expected signs and all estimates differ from 0 at the 1-percent significance level. Some evidence shows that bank development associates with higher, instead of, lower industrial volatility as found in Table 4 , and the estimate for the interaction between liquidity needs and bank development proves significantly negative on a consistent basis. This finding lends further support to Raddatz's (2006) claim that underdevelopment of the banking sector augments the volatility of industries that naturally require more liquid funds to operate. Columns (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Table 5 demonstrate that the above findings remain virtually unchanged when we add all four country controls at the same time and include the two initial conditions of the initial share of an industry in a country's manufacturing value added and the initial number of firms together with the squared bank development and the interaction between bank concentration and economic development (real GDP per-capita). In column (8), the estimates for bank development and its squared term prove significantly negative and positive, respectively, consistently illustrating a U-shaped effect and supporting Cecchetti and Kharroubi's (2012) argument that more finance does not always make things better. In column (9), both coefficients on bank concentration and the interaction between bank concentration and real GDP per-capita are positive, but insignificant. When we introduce the level of economic development, we identify no country-specific effect of bank concentration.
Thus, bank concentration exhibits no effect on growth volatility for more developed countries. This result proves similar to the finding of Deidda and Fattouh (2005) that bank concentration affects industrial growth adversely only in low-income countries. Table 6 reports the estimation results of Model (3), concentrating on the interaction-only specification. Across all regressions, we control for the country-and industry-specific effects with dummy variables, but omit the results for brevity. In columns (1) and (2) (1) and (2), with better banking development and more banking system concentration (competition) each exerting a negative (positive) effect on industrial growth volatility in all regression specifications. As such, our key finding of the volatility-reducing effect of bank concentration remains robust to alternative measures of banking market structure (concentration and/or competition). The result supports the hypothesis that less concentrated (more competitive) banking systems lead to more unstable growth paths in industries with higher liquidity needs.
Interaction-Only Model
Robustness Checks
Alternative Liquidity Needs Measures
As additional sensitivity checks, we first experiment with different measures of industrial needs for external liquidity such as the cash conversion cycle (cccycle), the ratio of labor cost to sales (lcost), and the portion of short-term debt to sales (stdebt). In each case, we interact these industrial liquidity need indicators with bank development and the countries' level of bank concentration and bank competition. We also include the initial conditioning variables along with country and industry dummy variables. Table 7 reports the results. These findings show that sectors more dependent on external liquidity needs enjoy a volatility-reducing effect from a more-developed banking system. In columns (1) to (3), we find negative and (mostly) significant effects of the interaction between different indicators of liquidity needs and bank concentration on industrial growth volatility. In columns (4) to (5), the interaction between various measures of liquidity needs and bank competition exerts a significantly positive effect, except for the proxy short-term debt in column (5). Overall, the evidence supports the view that a more-concentrated (competitive) banking system lessens (raises) growth volatility in value added for liquidity dependent industries.
Omitted Variables
Now, we investigate whether adding interactions between industrial liquidity needs and macroeconomic determinants of growth volatility eliminates the effect of bank concentration on industrial volatility. In all regressions, we include the initial conditioning variables, the country and industry dummy variables. Table 8 summarizes the results. Column (1) repeats the basic results for liquidity needs interacted with bank development and bank concentration, as reported in column (2) of Table 6 . Columns (2) to (5) of Table 8 present the results of adding the level of democracy, financial remoteness, economic development, or trade openness separately. Column (6) provides the findings with all the four variables included simultaneously. Only two of these four extra country variables, financial remoteness and trade openness, achieve statistical significance. The significantly negative coefficients from the first row of Table 8 indicate that bank development continues to play an important causal role in the reduction of industrial volatility in sectors with higher needs for external liquidity. In the second row, the coefficient estimates on the interactive term between liquidity needs and bank concentration are significantly negative. Accordingly, we find more support that a more-concentrated banking market structure reduces volatility in industries with high external liquidity needs. Finally, the analysis provides evidence supporting the outcome that bank development and bank concentration exert independent effects on reducing sectoral growth volatility through the provision of external liquidity needs.
The Channels
Previous subsections find that both banking sector development and concentration smooth industrial growth volatility in those industries with higher external liquidity needs. This subsection considers how this reduction occurs. We examine three potential channels through which bank development and bank concentration can moderate the volatility of the growth of real value added: (i) the growth volatility of value added per firm, (ii) the growth volatility in the number of firms, and/or (iii) the covariance between the prior two variables. Table 9 summarizes the empirical results on how the interaction of bank development and bank concentration with liquidity needs influences each of the three components of industrial growth volatility.
Following Raddatz (2006) , now we use variances rather than standard deviations of the real value added growth as the dependent variables. 13 The first row of Table 9 illustrates the differential effects of interaction between bank development and liquidity needs on sectoral volatility. The outcome reveals that a better-developed banking system smoothes the volatility of the real value added growth (column 1) via the 13 We experiment with standard deviations of the real value added growth as the dependent variables and obtain similar findings. Raddatz (2006) argues that to perform the variance decomposition, we need to use the variances instead of the standard deviations as the dependent variable.
reduction of the volatility of the growth of value added per firm (column 2) and the volatility of the growth in number of firms (column 3). The covariance between these two terms, however, becomes larger (column 4). According to the estimated coefficients, the volatility reduction effect of value added per firm substantially exceeds the effect in the number of firms and/or the covariance term. Consistent with Raddatz (2006) , the result supports the view that well-functioning banking system reduces the sectoral volatility by providing liquidity to smooth fluctuations in real value added per firm growth and the number of firms growth, but the volatility-mitigating effect of the first term dominates.
The second row of Table 9 
Conclusion
Completing the analysis of Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Raddatz (2006) , this study explores whether banking market structure, given the development of a country's banking sector, plays a role in determining industrial growth volatility. By applying the Rajan and Zingales (1998) specification to a large panel data of 47 countries, 70
four-digit ISIC industries, some interesting findings emerge. Economic Inquiry 44, 1-22. The concentration of commercial banks is measured as the ratio of the three largest banks' assets to total banking sector assets over 1980 to 1998, obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine ( , 2010 . The measure of bank competition comes from Claessens and Laeven (2005) and calculates the average H-statistic, using Panzar and Rosse's (1987) approach over 1987 to 1996. Note: The dependent variable is the standard deviation of real value added growth over 1981 to 1998 for each 4-digit ISIC industry in each country. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistics test the null hypothesis that the use of instrumental variables (legal origins) does not change the estimation results. We report IV estimates when the test is rejected at the 10-percent level or better. *, ** and † indicate significant at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels, respectively. Note: The dependent variables are (1) the variance of real value added growth over 1981 to 1998 (Column 1), the variance of the growth of real value added per firm over 1981 to 1998 (Column 2), the variance of the growth in the number of firms over 1981 to 1998 (Column 3), and the covariance between the growth of real value added per firm and the growth in the number of firms over 1981 to 1998 (Column 4) for each 4-digit ISIC industry in each country.
